巴菲特致股东的信（2014年）附录二：伯克希尔50周年过去现在和未来 ②查理理顺了我的思路

Charlie Straightens Me Out

查理理顺了我的思路

My cigar-butt strategy worked very well while I was managing small sums. Indeed, the many dozens of free puffs I obtained in the 1950s made that decade by far the best of my life for both relative and absolute investment performance.

当我管理小规模资金的时候，我的烟蒂策略非常的有效。事实上，我1950 年代所获得的几十次免费烟蒂，使得那10 年成为我人生迄今为止，不管是相对还是绝对投资表现都是最美好的10 年。

Even then, however, I made a few exceptions to cigar butts, the most important being GEICO. Thanks to a 1951 conversation I had with Lorimer Davidson, a wonderful man who later became CEO of the company, I learned that GEICO was a terrific business and promptly put 65% of my $9,800 net worth into its shares. Most of my gains in those early years, though, came from investments in mediocre companies that traded at bargain prices. Ben Graham had taught me that technique, and it worked.

然而，纵使是在当时，我也有一些非烟蒂类型的投资，其中最重要的是GEICO 保险。多亏了1951 年我和Lorimer Davidson 的谈话，他是一个很好的人，后来成为了该公司的CEO。从谈话中我得知，GEICO 是家极好的公司，并迅速将我9800 美元净资产的65％投入到它的股票中。不过，我早年的大部分收益来自于，投资低价交易的平庸公司。本杰明·格雷厄姆教给我这项技能，而且非常奏效。

But a major weakness in this approach gradually became apparent: Cigar-butt investing was scalable only to a point. With large sums, it would never work well.

但这个方法的一个主要缺点逐渐显现出来：烟蒂投资法只能在一定程度上扩大规模。对于大规模资金，它可能永远不会有效。

In addition, though marginal businesses purchased at cheap prices may be attractive as short-term investments, they are the wrong foundation on which to build a large and enduring enterprise. Selecting a marriage partner clearly requires more demanding criteria than does dating. (Berkshire, it should be noted, would have been a highly satisfactory “date”: If we had taken Seabury Stanton’s $11.375 offer for our shares, BPL’s weighted annual return on its Berkshire investment would have been about 40%.)

另外，尽管用便宜的价格购买边缘化的生意，作为短期投资可能很有吸引力，但它们是构造庞大而且持久的企业的错误基础。相比于约会，选择婚姻伴侣显然需要更苛刻的条件(需要指出的是，伯克希尔本来可能是一个非常令人满意的"约会"：如果我们接受了SeaburyStanton 提出的11.375 美元报价，BPL 对伯克希尔投资的加权年化回报率将高达40％。)

* * * * * * * * * * * *

It took Charlie Munger to break my cigar-butt habits and set the course for building a business that could combine huge size with satisfactory profits. Charlie had grown up a few hundred feet from where I now live and as a youth had worked, as did I, in my grandfather’s grocery store. Nevertheless, it was 1959 before I met Charlie, long after he had left Omaha to make Los Angeles his home. I was then 28 and he was 35. The Omaha doctor who introduced us predicted that we would hit it off – and we did.

上天派来查理·芒格打破了我的烟蒂投资习惯，并为建立一家规模巨大且利润丰厚的企业指明了方向。查理在距离我现在所住的地方大约几百英尺的地方长大，年轻时和我一样，在我祖父的杂货店里工作过。然而，直到1959 年我才见到查理，那时他早已经离开奥马哈定居洛杉矶了。当时我28 岁，他是35。介绍我们认识的奥马哈医生预测我们会一见如故，我们确实如此。

If you’ve attended our annual meetings, you know Charlie has a wide-ranging brilliance, a prodigious memory, and some firm opinions. I’m not exactly wishy-washy myself, and we sometimes don’t agree. In 56 years, however, we’ve never had an argument. When we differ, Charlie usually ends the conversation by saying: “Warren, think it over and you’ll agree with me because you’re smart and I’m right.”

如果你参加过我们的年会，就会知道查理才华横溢，记忆力惊人，观点坚定。我并不真的是思路不清，而且我们有时意见也不一致。然而56 年来，我们从未争吵过。当我们意见分歧，查理往往用这句话结束我们的对话："沃伦，再仔细想想，你会赞成我的观点，因为你很聪明，而我是对的。"

What most of you do not know about Charlie is that architecture is among his passions. Though he began his career as a practicing lawyer (with his time billed at $15 per hour), Charlie made his first real money in his 30s by designing and building five apartment projects near Los Angeles. Concurrently, he designed the house that he lives in today – some 55 years later. (Like me, Charlie can’t be budged if he is happy in his surroundings.) In recent years, Charlie has designed large dorm complexes at Stanford and the University of Michigan and today, at age 91, is working on another major project.

你们大多数人所不知道的是，建筑是查理的爱好之一。尽管查理的职业生涯始于执业律师(那时候时薪为15美元/小时)，但他在30 多岁时通过设计并且建造了洛杉矶附近的5 个公寓楼项目，赚到了第一桶金。同时，他设计了现在已经居住了55 年的房子。(和我一样，如果他对周围环境感到满意，他就不愿意搬家。)在最近几年，查理设计了斯坦福和密歇根大学的大型宿舍楼，如今91 岁高龄的他，正在进来另一个重大项目。

From my perspective, though, Charlie’s most important architectural feat was the design of today’s Berkshire. The blueprint he gave me was simple: Forget what you know about buying fair businesses at wonderful prices; instead, buy wonderful businesses at fair prices.

然而在我看来，查理最重要的建筑成就就是设计了今天的伯克希尔。他给我的蓝图很简单：忘记你所知道的以极低的价格买入普通生意；相反地，要以合理的价格买入伟大的生意。

Altering my behavior is not an easy task (ask my family). I had enjoyed reasonable success without Charlie’s input, so why should I listen to a lawyer who had never spent a day in business school (when – ahem – I had attended three). But Charlie never tired of repeating his maxims about business and investing to me, and his logic was irrefutable. Consequently, Berkshire has been built to Charlie’s blueprint. My role has been that of general contractor, with the CEOs of Berkshire’s subsidiaries doing the real work as sub-contractors.

改变我的行为不是一件容易的事(问问我的家人)。没有查理的参与，我已经获得了相当大的成功，所以我为什么应该去听一个从未在商学院呆过一天的律师的话呢？(而我待过三个：宾法沃顿商学院，内布拉斯加商学院，哥伦比亚商学院)。但是查理不厌其烦地对我重复他的商业和投资的箴言，他的逻辑是不可反驳的。因此，伯克希尔是依据查理的蓝图建立的。我的角色是总承建商，而伯克希尔子公司CEO 们，则作为分包商做着实际工作。

The year 1972 was a turning point for Berkshire (though not without occasional backsliding on my part – remember my 1975 purchase of Waumbec). We had the opportunity then to buy See’s Candy for Blue Chip Stamps, a company in which Charlie, I and Berkshire had major stakes, and which was later merged into Berkshire.

1972 年是伯克希尔的一个转折年(尽管我偶尔还是会出现滑坡——还记得我1975 年收购Waumbec 的交易吗)。那时我们有机会为蓝筹印花公司购买喜诗糖果，查理，我和伯克希尔拥有大量蓝筹印花股票，后来并入了伯克希尔。

See’s was a legendary West Coast manufacturer and retailer of boxed chocolates, then annually earning about $4 million pre-tax while utilizing only $8 million of net tangible assets. Moreover, the company had a huge asset that did not appear on its balance sheet: a broad and durable competitive advantage that gave it significant pricing power. That strength was virtually certain to give See’s major gains in earnings over time. Better yet, these would materialize with only minor amounts of incremental investment. In other words, See’s could be expected to gush cash for decades to come.

喜诗糖果是西海岸一家传奇的巧克力制造商和零售商，当时税前利润约400 万美元，而净有形资产仅有800万美元。另外，公司拥有一项资产负债表上从未曾体现的巨大资产：广泛的而持久的竞争优势，赋予它巨大的定价权。这个优势长期几乎肯定会给喜诗糖果带来重大增量收益。更好的是，只需要少量的增量投资，这些增量收益就会实现。换句话说，喜诗糖果有望在未来几十年里，涌现出巨大的现金流。

The family controlling See’s wanted $30 million for the business, and Charlie rightly said it was worth that much. But I didn’t want to pay more than $25 million and wasn’t all that enthusiastic even at that figure. (A price that was three times net tangible assets made me gulp.) My misguided caution could have scuttled a terrific purchase. But, luckily, the sellers decided to take our $25 million bid.

控制喜诗糖果的家族希望要价3000 万美元，查理正确地指出它值这个价钱。但我并不想支付超过2500 万美元，甚至对2500 万美元我也不没有多少热情(三倍于有形资产的价格让我相当为难)。我的错误的谨慎，差一点毁了这桩极好的收购。但是，幸运的是，卖家决定接受我们2500 万美元的报价。

To date, See’s has earned $1.9 billion pre-tax, with its growth having required added investment of only $40 million. See’s has thus been able to distribute huge sums that have helped Berkshire buy other businesses that, in turn, have themselves produced large distributable profits. (Envision rabbits breeding.) Additionally, through watching See’s in action, I gained a business education about the value of powerful brands that opened my eyes to many other profitable investments.

迄今为止，喜诗糖果累积税前利润为19 亿美元，而它的成长，仅仅需要4000 万美元的额外投资。因此喜诗可以分派巨额资金，帮助伯克希尔去购买其他生意，而这些生意本身又产生了巨额可分配利润(像兔子繁殖一样)。另外，通过观察喜诗的交易，我获得了有关强大品牌价值的商业教育，开拓了我的眼光，让我看到了许多其他有利可图的投资机会。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Even with Charlie’s blueprint, I have made plenty of mistakes since Waumbec. The most gruesome was Dexter Shoe. When we purchased the company in 1993, it had a terrific record and in no way looked to me like a cigar butt. Its competitive strengths, however, were soon to evaporate because of foreign competition. And I simply didn’t see that coming.

纵使有了查理的蓝图，自错误收购Waumbec 以来，我还是犯了很多错误。最可怕的是收购Dexter 鞋业。当我们于1993 年收购这家公司时，它有着出色的记录，在我看来全然不像烟蒂股。然而，由于外国的激烈竞争，它的竞争优势很快蒸发了。而我根本没有想到这一点。

Consequently, Berkshire paid $433 million for Dexter and, rather promptly, its value went to zero. GAAP accounting, however, doesn’t come close to recording the magnitude of my error. The fact is that I gave Berkshire stock to the sellers of Dexter rather than cash, and the shares I used for the purchase are now worth about $5.7 billion. As a financial disaster, this one deserves a spot in the Guinness Book of World Records.

因此，伯克希尔为Dexter 支付的4.33 亿美元很快便归零了。然而，GAAP 会计核算却没有很好地反映出我错误的程度。事实是我支付给Dexter 卖家的不是现金，而是伯克希尔股票。我用于收购的那部分股票，现在价值大约57 亿美元。作为一场金融灾难，理应写进吉尼斯世界纪录。

Several of my subsequent errors also involved the use of Berkshire shares to purchase businesses whose earnings were destined to simply limp along. Mistakes of that kind are deadly. Trading shares of a wonderful business – which Berkshire most certainly is – for ownership of a so-so business irreparably destroys value.

我随后犯下的几个错误，还包括使用伯克希尔的股票去购买那些利润注定会衰退的企业。这类错误是致命的。用优秀企业的股票(伯克希尔必然是)去交换普通企业的所有权，会不可挽回地毁灭价值。

We’ve also suffered financially when this mistake has been committed by companies whose shares Berkshire has owned (with the errors sometimes occurring while I was serving as a director). Too often CEOs seem blind to an elementary reality: The intrinsic value of the shares you give in an acquisition must not be greater than the intrinsic value of the business you receive.

当伯克希尔持股的公司犯下这种错误的时候，我们同样会遭受财务上的损失(有时这些错误还发生在我担任董事期间)。CEO 们往往对对一个基本现实视而不见：你在并购中所付出的股份的内在价值，不能高于你所获得的公司股份的内在价值。

I’ve yet to see an investment banker quantify this all-important math when he is presenting a stock-for- stock deal to the board of a potential acquirer. Instead, the banker’s focus will be on describing “customary” premiums-to-market-price that are currently being paid for acquisitions – an absolutely asinine way to evaluate the attractiveness of an acquisition – or whether the deal will increase the acquirer’s earnings-per-share (which in itself should be far from determinative). In striving to achieve the desired per-share number, a panting CEO and his “helpers” will often conjure up fanciful “synergies.” (As a director of 19 companies over the years, I’ve never heard “dis-synergies” mentioned, though I’ve witnessed plenty of these once deals have closed.) Post mortems of acquisitions, in which reality is honestly compared to the original projections, are rare in American boardrooms. They should instead be standard practice.

我至今没有看到一位投资银行家，在向潜在收购方董事会提交换股收购时，量化这个重要的数学依据。相反地，这些银行家的专注点将放在描述，为收购支付的市场价格的"惯常"溢价上，这是评估收购吸引力的一种绝对愚蠢的方式，或者这个交易是否将会增加收购方的每股收益(它本身应该远非决定性因素)。在努力实现预期的每股收益数字的过程中，气喘吁吁的CEO 和他的"顾问们"，常常会想象出一种美妙的"协同效应"。(多年来，作为19家公司的董事，我从未听说过"不协同效应"，虽然我在交易结束后目睹了许多这样的情况)。在美国企业的董事会里，很少会有收购的事后剖析复盘，相反，这一过程应该是标准做法。

I can promise you that long after I’m gone, Berkshire’s CEO and Board will carefully make intrinsic value calculations before issuing shares in any acquisitions. You can’t get rich trading a hundred-dollar bill for eight tens (even if your advisor has handed you an expensive “fairness” opinion endorsing that swap).

我可以向你保证，在我离开后很长一段时间内，伯克希尔的CEO 和董事会，在任何发行股票的收购之前，都会仔细地做好内在价值的计算。你不可能用一张100 美元的钞票去交换8 张10 美元的钞票而致富。(即使你的顾问帮你出具了昂贵的"公平交易"的意见来为这种交换背书)。

* * * * * * * * * * * *

Overall, Berkshire’s acquisitions have worked out well – and very well in the case of a few large ones. So, too, have our investments in marketable securities. The latter are always valued on our balance sheet at their market prices so any gains – including those unrealized – are immediately reflected in our net worth. But the businesses we buy outright are never revalued upward on our balance sheet, even when we could sell them for many billions of dollars more than their carrying value. The unrecorded gains in the value of Berkshire’s subsidiaries have become huge, with these growing at a particularly fast pace in the last decade.

总的来说，伯克希尔的收购进展顺利，在一些大型收购中做得非常不错。我们对有价证券的投资也是如此。后者在我们的财报上总是以市值计算，所以任何的收益(包括那些尚未实现的投资收益)都会立即反映在我们的资产净值中。但是那些我们完全买断的公司，在我们的资产负债表上从未向上重新估值，即使我们可以以高出账面价值数十亿美元的价格出售它们。伯克希尔子公司中未记录的价值增值已经变得非常巨大，在过去的十年里增速特别快。

Listening to Charlie has paid off.

听查理的话得到了回报。